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INTRODUCTION

Following Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, there was notable commentary about what the “undue burden” test
outlined in the opinion would mean for states seeking to restrict access to
abortion services. 1 When the case was decided, it effectively invited more
conservative states to pass increasingly restrictive abortion legislation under
the guise that the laws furthered a compelling state interest and did not create
an undue burden for a woman seeking a legal abortion. 2 But, in 2016,
∗
Author is a term clerk to the Honorable William O. Bertelsman of the Eastern District of Kentucky
and is a graduate of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Author would like to thank Jonathan
Entin for his advice and guidance throughout the research and drafting process.
1
505 U.S. 833, 876–79 (1992).
2
Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Impact of the New Undue Burden Standard on
Reproductive Health Care, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2249, 2253 (1993) (“Although the Court’s opinion
indicates that there should be a fact-finding process . . . many states may try to avoid this procedure by
passing or trying to revive restrictions that are similar to those upheld in Casey and arguing that,
accordingly, they should be upheld.”); see Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
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abortion rights were given more strength than ever before when the Supreme
Court decided Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 3 The case involved
review of a Texas statute that required physicians who performed abortions
to have admitting privileges within a thirty-mile radius of their outpatient
office. 4 The Court gave more substance to the meaning of the undue burden
test by applying a cost-benefit analysis. 5 The Court thus struck down the law
as unconstitutional because the admitting privileges requirement offered no
health benefits to women and imposed an undue burden on a woman seeking
a pre-viability abortion. 6 At the time, legal scholars hailed Whole Woman’s
Health as a case that offered women seeking abortions significant protection
from state regulations. 7
In the past four years, a major shift among the judiciary has, in the
eyes of pro-life activists at least, created the perfect environment to have
Casey overturned or significantly limited. 8 But the issue is far more
complicated because the doctrine of stare decisis protects the Casey holding
and its progeny, and failure to respect the doctrine could lead to questions of
legitimacy of the Court. 9 Even so, given the change in its composition,
abortion providers and other pro-choice plaintiffs who bring lawsuits in
federal court challenging these restrictions are increasingly wary of the risk
they take when they appeal an unfavorable lower court decision to the

100 MICH. L. REV. 1980, 1986–91 (2002) (“Despite its willingness to reaffirm Roe, the Casey opinion
suffers from the Court's failure to develop a coherent and confident theory of what abortion rights have
meant for women over the years since Roe was decided.”); Sara L. Doyle, Casenote, Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey: Adopting the Unduly Burdensome Standard, 44 MERCER L. REV. 717, 728 (1993)
(observing that under Casey, “the courts are forced to employ the subjective ‘unduly burdensome’ analysis
and hope not to impart their own biases.”).
3
See 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
4
Id. at 2310.
5
Id. at 2318.
6
Id.
7
See John A. Robertson, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion
Regulation, 7 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 623, 643 (2017) (noting that “Whole Woman's Health is a major setback
for the antichoice movement.”); Kate Greasley, Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt, 80 Mod. L. Rev. 325, 338 (2017) (arguing that the change in scrutiny would make it more
difficult for politicians to pass restrictions that would be upheld when challenged). But see Leah M.
Litman, Unduly Burdening Women’s Health: How Lower Courts are Undermining Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 50, 51 (2017) (“For whatever reason, states and the
federal courts of appeals do not seem to have gotten the message, or they are just refusing to hear it. States
and courts of appeals are seeking to cabin Hellerstedt in a variety of unpersuasive ways and recycling—
occasionally with success—many of the arguments that Hellerstedt rejected.”). Id.
8
See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, As Passions Flare in Abortion Debate, Many Americans Say ‘It’s
Complicated,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/us/politics/abortiondebate-pennsylvania.html; Amelia Thompson-DeVeaux, Here’s Why the Anti-Abortion Movement is
Escalating, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 21, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/we-categorizedhundreds-of-abortion-restrictions-heres-why-the-anti-abortion-movement-is-escalating/; What’s Going
On In The Fight Over U.S. Abortion Rights?, BBC NEWS (June 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-us-canada-47940659.
9
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2012) (arguing that when cases get overturned too frequently, it gives the impression the Court
is not functioning in accordance with the rule of law).
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Supreme Court. 10 An example of this risk arose when the Fifth Circuit refused
to follow the Whole Woman’s Health holding in June Medical
Services v. Gee, reasoning that a nearly identical law to the one in
Whole Woman’s Health did not create an undue burden because of slight
factual differences. 11 The Supreme Court narrowly reversed. 12 Chief Justice
Roberts, who dissented in Whole Woman’s Health, was the deciding vote,
concurring in the judgment based only on stare decisis. 13 His concurrence
rejected the Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit analysis and instead offered
support for the less stringent undue burden test. 14
Though June Medical was initially seen as a win for pro-choice
advocates, in the months following the opinion, it became clear that
June Medical laid the groundwork for the Court to revisit the standard of
review for abortion restrictions. 15 A major question left unanswered was
whether June Medical overruled Whole Woman’s Health under the Marks
rule, which states that when the Supreme Court does not have a majority
opinion in a given case, “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by [the majority of the Court] who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds.” 16 To this point, in Hopkins v. Jegley, the Eighth
Circuit held that Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion was controlling
because his opinion provided the narrowest grounds to reach a majority. 17
Because Justice Roberts rejected the reasoning in Whole Woman’s Health, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that Whole Woman’s Health and its cost-benefit
analysis was no longer controlling. 18 The Sixth and Fifth Circuits have agreed
with the Eighth Circuit, but the Seventh Circuit has rejected this approach. 19
10
See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Identity Contests: Litigation and the Meaning of Social-Movement Causes,
86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1273, 1277 (2015) (noting that in the history of abortion litigation, “[l]ay actors and
lawyers alike stayed away from arguments thought likely to jeopardize litigation strategies, and in the
process narrowed their demands, pushed important arguments below the surface, and silenced
voices . . . .”).
11
905 F.3d 787, 805–15 (5th Cir. 2018).
12
June Medical Services v. Russo, 140 S.Ct. 2103, 2109 (2020).
13
Id.
14
Id. at 2134–35 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
15
See Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: With Roberts providing the fifth vote, court strikes down
Louisiana abortion law (June 29, 2020, 12:49 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/opinionanalysis-with-roberts-providing-the-fifth-vote-court-strikes-down-louisiana-abortion-law/ (writing that
the decision was clearly a victory for the challengers even if the holding was narrow); Cynthia YeeWallace, Symposium: Chief Justice Roberts reins in the cavalry of abortion providers charging toward the
elimination of abortion regulation, (Jun. 29, 2020, 7:46 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/
symposium-chief-justice-roberts-reins-in-the-cavalry-of-abortion-providers-charging-toward-theelimination-of-abortion-regulation/ (noting that the case was a victory for states who wish to pass laws that
will meet constitutional requirements of the Casey two-part test).
16
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
17
968 F.3d 912, 915–16 (8th Cir. 2020).
18
Id.
19
See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 433, nn.8–9 (6th Cir. 2020)
(noting the court’s agreement with the Eighth Circuit and that, at the time, a three-judge panel from the
Fifth Circuit rejected the rationale that the Chief Justice’s opinion is controlling); Whole Woman’s Health
v. Paxton, 10 F.4th 430, 440 (5th Cir 2021) (en banc) (adopting Chief Justice Robert’s concurrence as the
controlling opinion from June Medical). But see Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Box, 991 F.3d 740,
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These cases illustrate tension among two long-standing
Supreme Court doctrines. Applying Marks to June Medical might lead to the
conclusion that Whole Woman’s Health is no longer good law. However, this
conclusion goes against the principle that only the Supreme Court can
overrule one of its precedents. Absent explicit language from the Court
overturning Whole Woman’s Health, the June Medical opinion has left many
lower courts confused as to its proper application to currently pending
abortion restriction cases. Accordingly, June Medical illustrated a rare
scenario in which an arguably proper Marks application leads to an
impermissible anticipatory overruling of precedent by a lower court.
In light of this tension, this Article will analyze the benefits and
disadvantages of the Supreme Court’s potential resolution to either amend or
jettison the Marks rule and the strict prohibition on anticipatory overrulings.
Part I will examine the background of the anticipatory overrulings doctrine
and the Marks rule. Part II will briefly discuss the current landscape of
Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence. Part III will examine the recent
controversial Eighth Circuit opinion and compare this to the other circuits that
have addressed whether Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in June Medical is
controlling. Part IV will then explore possible resolutions the Supreme Court
can apply, framing it through the context of June Medical and
Whole Woman’s Health. As Part IV will illustrate, resolution of this tension
is difficult, and each option will have consequences that go beyond the
June Medical application. Finally, Part V will provide a brief conclusion of
the assertions made throughout; in considering which option may be best, the
Court must weigh the importance of respect for precedent with the need for
uniformity among the lower courts.
II.

ANTICIPATORY OVERRULINGS AND THE MARKS RULE

The Eighth Circuit in Hopkins v. Jegley declined to apply
Whole Woman’s Health, reasoning that the Court in June Medical effectively
overruled it. 20 The Eighth Circuit relied on Marks in its explanation of its
interpretation of the June Medical holding. 21 However, because the Supreme
Court did not explicitly overrule Whole Woman’s Health, the Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation and application of June Medical directly contradicts the general
rule that only the Supreme Court can overrule precedent. Therefore, this
section discusses the Court’s historical treatment of lower courts that engage

746 (7th Cir. 2021) (“We simply do not survey non-majority opinions to count likely votes and boldly
anticipate overruling of Supreme Court precedents).
20
968 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 2020).
21
Id. at 914–16.
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in anticipatory overrulings and the difficulty such lower courts have had in
applying the Marks rule. 22
A. Admonishing Lower Courts for Ignoring Precedent
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has admonished lower courts
for failing to follow precedent. 23 This is likely because the doctrine of
stare decisis provides many benefits. The Supreme Court has noted that
stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” 24
A benefit of courts’ consistent and predictable application of the law is that
it gives the public adequate notice of their rights while promoting judicial
efficiency because already established rights can be disposed of in earlier
stages of litigation. 25 Additionally, the doctrine of stare decisis prevents the
constant reevaluation of core holdings when new Justices are appointed to the
court, a lack of which could create a flood of litigation every few years.26
Of course, there is some criticism of the doctrine. First, some argue that the
doctrine prevents the legal field from adapting quickly to changes in society. 27
Second, it perpetuates possibly erroneous decisions, especially if the rationale
for the controlling case is dubious. 28
Nonetheless, the doctrine of stare decisis is sometimes unpersuasive,
and the Court will overrule its previous decisions. 29 For example, in
22
As an initial note, some legal scholars refer to anticipatory overrulings as “under-rulings.” See
Christopher Bryant & Kimberly Breedon, How the Prohibition on "Under-Ruling" Distorts the Judicial
Function (and What to do About It), 45 PEPP. L. REV. 505, 507 (2018).
23
See Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S.Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (per curiam) (“[T]he court was wrong to go further
and conclude that Payne [v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991),] implicitly overruled Booth [v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987),] in its entirety.”); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2005) (“There is, in short, no
basis for respondents’ and the Court of Appeals’ view that the Totten [v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876),]
bar has been reduced to an example of the state secrets privilege. In a far closer case than this, we observed
that if the ‘precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected
in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving
to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’”) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“We
do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by
implication, overruled an earlier precedent.”).
24
Kimble v. Marvel Enter., 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
827–28 (1991)).
25
Waldron, supra note 9, at 4, 10.
26
Id. at 4.
27
See Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L. J. 1573,
1590 (2014) (arguing that allowing lower courts to not follow Supreme Court precedent in narrow
circumstances would allow courts to react to changes more quickly); C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead
Precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REV.
39, 42 (1990) (arguing that anticipatory overrulings make the law more responsive to societal changes and
promotes judicial efficiency).
28
Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 27, at 1576–77; see also Bradford, supra note 27, at 42 (noting
that allowing anticipatory overruling would promote equal treatment of the parties).
29
See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command.”); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928));
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
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Payne v. Tennessee, the Court declined to adhere to stare decisis, calling it
a “principle of policy and not a mechanical formula . . . .” 30 Particularly,
the Court noted that constitutional cases may be an area where the Court is
less likely to adhere to stare decisis because of the impossibility of legislative
correction; a distinction when compared to other contract and property cases
“where reliance interests are involved.” 31
One of the best explanations of when the Court chooses not to follow
precedent came from Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in their
plurality opinion in Casey. 32 Therein, the Justices explained four factors the
Court considers when asked to overrule precedent: (1) the quality of the past
decision’s reasoning; (2) its consistency with related decisions; (3) legal
developments since the past decision; and (4) reliance on the decision
throughout the legal system and society. 33 In Casey, for example, the Justices
noted that the rule from Roe v. Wade contributed to immeasurable numbers
of women placing such a reliance on the right to abortion that overruling that
decision would create a substantial hardship. 34 Thus, the Court reaffirmed the
basic holding of Roe v. Wade. 35
In practice, sometimes, the controlling decision is not as clear as
a subsequent opinion that directly overrules a previous decision. There are
many instances where cases have made their way to the Supreme Court, and
the Court treats the old precedent as if it has been effectively overruled for
quite some time. 36 But in some cases, clearly erroneous law has yet to be
formally overturned by the Supreme Court. For example, Buck v. Bell is
regarded as one of the worst Supreme Court decisions in history, a decision
that effectively permitted the sterilization of mentally ill and genetically
abnormal individuals. 37 While Buck v. Bell has never been explicitly
overturned, a series of lower court rulings implicitly overturned it. 38
(1842)); W. Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
30
501 U.S. at 827–30 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
31
Id. at 828.
32
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992) (devoting a large portion of the
opinion to explaining why stare decisis was important in the case).
33
See id. at 854–55.
34
Id. at 854–56.
35
Id. at 856.
36
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S.Ct. 2392 (2018) (stating “Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in
the court of history, and—to be clear—'has no place in law under the Constitution.’”)); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Superseded by statute); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (overruled
by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (stating “[w]hatever may have been the extent of
psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern
authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”)). For an interesting
discussion on overruling by implication, see generally Bradley Scott Shannon, Overruled by Implication,
33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 151 (2009).
37
See 274 U.S. 200, 205–08 (1927). Justice Holmes infamously wrote, “[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough.” Id. at 207.
38
Edward J. Larson, Putting Buck v. Bell in Scientific and Historical Context: A Response to Victoria
Nourse, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 119, 126 (2011). See, e.g., Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 762
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Thus, this begs the question of whether, as a multitude of genetic-based
abortion bans make their way through the lower court system, should we
allow for Buck to control because the Supreme Court has not directly said it
is overruled? Of course, it seems highly probable that if the issue in
Buck v. Bell did reach the Supreme Court, the Court would formally overrule
it. But should we expect lower courts to adhere to it in the meantime?
Often, the Court will still applaud the circuit or district court for
applying the precedent, even if it is ultimately overturned. 39 For example, in
State Oil Co. v. Khan, the Court wrote, “[t]he Court of Appeals was correct
in applying that principle despite disagreement with [the precedent], for it is
this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” 40
This deliberate acknowledgment by the Court that precedent was correctly
followed indicates the Court’s desire to have the final say on which cases get
overruled.
Though the Supreme Court cases discussed thus far stem from the
federal court system, state courts also follow the same principle. The state
superior courts bind the lower-level state courts, and lower courts are
not permitted to engage in anticipatory overrulings. For example, the
Arizona Supreme Court admonished one of the lower state courts, writing,
“we note that the superior court erred by anticipating that we would revisit
and overrule [precedent case] after [related case]. The lower courts are bound
by our decisions, and this Court alone is responsible for modifying that
precedent.” 41 The Illinois Supreme Court even referred to this obligation to
adhere to precedent as a “duty.” 42
This strict rule requiring adherence to Supreme Court precedent was
established in the 1989 case Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.. 43 Prior to this case, there were two competing schools of
thought among lower court judges: some judges adhered to the blind
adherence policy while others were willing to disregard precedent if they
believed the Supreme Court would not follow it. 44 However, even within the
courts that allowed anticipatory overrulings, disagreements emerged about
(Cal. 1985) (refusing to allow a guardian to have a mentally disabled female sterilized because there was
a lack of evidence showing that other less intrusive means of birth control were not available); In re
Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641–42 (Wash. 1980) (holding that guardian failed to meet burden
of proof that sterilization would be in the disabled woman’s best interest).
39
See, e.g., United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001) (“The Court of Appeals was correct in
applying Evans [v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920),].to the instant case, given that ‘it is this Court’s prerogative
alone to overrule one of its precedents.’ State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997). Nonetheless, the
court below, in effect, has invited us to reconsider Evans. We now overrule Evans insofar as it holds that
the Compensation Clause forbids Congress to apply a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax to the
salaries of federal judges, whether or not they were appointed before enactment of the tax.”).
40
522 U.S. at 20.
41
Sell v. Gama, 295 P.3d 421, 428 (Ariz. 2013) (citations omitted).
42
Yakich v. Aulds, 155 N.E.3d 1093, 1095 (Ill. 2019).
43
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
44
Bradford, supra note 27, at 40, 45.
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when its use was proper; some judges advocated for a “near certainty”
standard while others advocated for a mere “preponderance standard.” 45
Thus, when the issue of adhering to precedent reached the Supreme Court in
1989, the Court swiftly clarified and restricted overruling precedent solely to
the highest court. 46 Justice Kennedy wrote:
We do not suggest that the Court of Appeals on its own
authority should have taken the step of renouncing Wilko
[v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427]. If a precedent of this Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. 47
B. Rare Exceptions
Although the Justices often write about precedent as if they
consistently apply it, that is far from true. On rare occasions, the lower court
has clearly issued an anticipatory overruling, and when it reaches the
Supreme Court, the Court agrees without admonishing the lower court.
One of the premier examples of this arose in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette. 48 In the precedent 1940 case, Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law requiring
students enrolled in public school to salute the flag, even if they had religious
objections to doing so. 49 But, less than two years later, a West Virginia threejudge district court declined to uphold a similar state law, finding that Gobitis
was wrongly decided and the freedom to choose what to believe in was a
fundamental right in the United States. 50 The district court reasoned that if
the issue were to go before the Supreme Court, the Court likely would not
uphold Gobitis. 51 Writing for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Parker first analyzed
the current composition of the Supreme Court and noted that at least four
members thought the reasoning in Gobitis was unsound. 52 He then noted the
Court’s unwillingness to cite Gobitis in a subsequent case where it was clearly
supporting authority. 53 This evidence and his personal belief that the flag
salutation statute was a violation of religious freedoms led Judge Parker to
conclude that the district court was not obligated to follow Gobitis. 54
Id. at 45–46.
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484.
47
Id. For more discussion about the context with which the Rodriguez opinion was made, see
Bradford, supra note 27, at 66–68.
48
See generally 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
49
310 U.S. 586, 592–93, 599–600 (1940).
50
Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D. W. Va. 1942).
51
See id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
45
46
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The case was appealed to the Supreme Court. 55 In a decision penned
by Justice Jackson, the Court affirmed the lower court decision and overruled
Gobitis. 56 Neither the majority nor the dissent criticized the lower court for
failing to follow precedent. 57 Of course, there is no requirement that the Court
reprimand the lower courts for failing to follow precedent. But, given how
temporally close together these cases were decided, it seems peculiar that the
Court mentioned nothing about the district court ignoring precedent despite
anticipating that the Supreme Court would overrule itself only three years
later.
Another infamous example of a lower court’s failure to follow
precedent without admonishment is Younger v. Harris. 58 In that case, a man
was charged under California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act in federal court,
and he argued that the statute was unconstitutional despite the Supreme Court
ruling in Whitney v. California that it was consistent with the First
Amendment. 59 The district court, in 1968, explained that statutes that chilled
speech had since been held to strict scrutiny, and therefore Whitney was no
longer controlling. 60 The Supreme Court formally overruled Whitney in a
separate 1969 case; when Younger reached the Court, the Justices did not
reprimand the lower court for declining to follow precedent that, at the time,
was still good law. 61
There are other examples of lower courts engaging in anticipatory
overrulings that never made it as far as the Supreme Court. For example,
Brown v. Board of Education applied only to educational facilities,
and the Supreme Court did not actually overrule Plessy v. Ferguson. 62
However, many lower courts declined to follow Plessy in the wake of
Brown v. Board of Education thus expanding the Court’s reasoning to cover
more than educational facilities. 63 This was also a prevalent issue with
Lochner-era cases, as many cases were never formally overruled but were
See generally W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 642.
57
See id. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion in Gobitis, wrote a vigorous dissent,
personally attacking the majority opinion. Id. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). “As a member of this
Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply
I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard.” Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
58
See generally 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
59
Id. at 38–40.
60
Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 511–16 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev’d, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
61
See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37; see also Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 57–58 (1968)
(agreeing with the circuit court that did not follow precedent by reasoning that the precedent was no longer
good law).
62
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896). As
legal scholar C. Stephen Bradford observed, many legal search tools incorrectly label Plessy as overturned
by Brown v. Board of Education. Bradford, supra note 29 at 71 nn. 179. “Actually, Plessy has never been
overturned.” Id.
63
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (explicitly declining to follow Plessy v.
Ferguson, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896), because it had been implicitly overruled); Flemming v. S.C. Elec. & Gas
Co., 224 F.2d 752, 752–53 (4th Cir. 1955) (reasoning there is no doubt Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 S. Ct. 1138
(1896), had been repudiated).
55
56
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nonetheless no longer applied by lower courts because they were viewed as
bad law. 64
Courts in Canada have recently tackled a similar issue. In 2018,
a New Brunswick provincial court declined to follow a 1921 Supreme Court
of Canada precedent that upheld statutory restrictions on bringing alcoholic
beverages into the province. 65 The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the
judgment, choosing to uphold precedent. 66 However, the Court there noted
that while lower courts are generally required to follow precedents from
higher courts, a narrow exception allows lower courts to engage in
anticipatory overrulings. 67
The Supreme Court of Canada better explained this exception in the
2013 case Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford. 68 Therein, the Court
explained the narrow exception is acceptable where: (1) a new legal issue is
raised; and (2) there is a change in the circumstance or evidence that
“fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.”69 Of course, this could
be a difficult standard for lower courts in the United States to apply because
the standard seems to be amorphous and discretionary. But this explanation
still suggests that if a lower court can articulate these factors, a disregard for
precedent may be acceptable in narrow cases. The United States has
seemingly never explicitly created a similarly narrow exception.
C. The Closely Intertwined Marks Rule
One of the more confusing judicial doctrines underpinning the
application of precedent comes from a 1977 Supreme Court case,
Marks v. United States. 70 In Marks, the petitioners were charged with
transporting obscene materials across state lines. 71 The petitioners argued that
they were entitled to a “more favorable formulation” of jury instruction under
a recent plurality decision in Memoirs v. Massachusetts. 72 The Court
disagreed; writing for the majority, Justice Powell concluded that “the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .” 73 What this means
is that a mere concurrence may, in the right situations, become the controlling
64
See Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817, 818–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd., 380 U.S. 520 (1965)
(disregarding Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927), as no longer controlling law). For a more
in-depth discussion on both the post-Brown and Lochner-era cases, see Bradford, supra note 27, at 71–74.
65
R. v. Comeau (2016), 448 N.B.R.2d 1 (Can. N.B. Prov. Ct.), rev’d, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 342 (Can.).
66
R. v. Comeau, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 342, 343–44 (Can.).
67
Id.
68
See generally Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (Can.).
69
Id. at 42.
70
See generally 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
71
Id. at 189.
72
Id. at 190.
73
Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
& Stevens, JJ.)).
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opinion. 74 Or, in some cases, a single Justice’s opinion may be controlling
where the rest of the Court splits four-to-one-to-four. 75
Though the Marks rule seems simple, its application has greatly
confused lower courts and led to inconsistent applications. Lower courts are
often split on how to measure which holding is, in fact, the narrowest.
First, some courts apply the “‘reasoning’ approach.” 76 Under this test, an
opinion is controlling only if the narrowest opinion represents a “common
denominator.” 77 In other words, “it must embody a position implicitly
approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment.” 78 But, because
the Supreme Court “reviews judgments, not opinions,” in cases where the
Court is presented with multiple issues, there may be times when a majority
does not agree on all the issues. 79 Therefore, there are, in effect, multiple
“majority opinions” where there is no logical connection between the
opinions to clearly identify the narrowest opinion under Marks. 80
Accordingly, some plurality opinions never yield a controlling opinion under
this test.
The second test looks to the results of a Justice’s opinion rather than
their reasoning. 81 Under the “results” test, the narrowest opinion is the one
that states the rule that “would necessarily produce results with which a
majority of the Justices from the controlling case would agree.” 82 Thus, under
this theory, every plurality decision yields a controlling opinion. 83
The Supreme Court has not provided much guidance on the
application of Marks. In 2011, Justice Sotomayor’s solo concurrence in
Freeman v. United States was treated as the controlling opinion by many
74
See e.g., Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011). Here, Justice Sotomayor’s solo
concurrence is the controlling precedent because her reasoning was the narrowest despite all eight of the
other justices disagreeing with her reasoning. See id. at 534–45; see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 658 F.3d
608, 611 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Justice Sotomayor’s opinion is the narrowest ground for the Court’s decision
and thus represents the Court’s holding in Freeman.”).
75
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Or. v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970). But see Peter Lehmuller & Dennis Gregory, Affirmative Action: From Before Bakke to After
Grutter, 42 NASPA J. 430, 434–47 (2004) (noting that Bakke did not result in a consistent interpretation
by lower courts).
76
See United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2016).
77
King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
78
Id.
79
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (footnote omitted);
see Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint,
69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 816 (2017).
80
Williams, supra note 79, at 816–17.
81
United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2016).
82
Davis, 825 F.3d at 1021; see also United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In most cases, the commonsense way to
apply Marks is to identify and follow the opinion that occupies the middle ground between (i) the broader
opinion supporting the judgment and (ii) the dissenting opinion. That middle-ground opinion will produce
results that represent a subset of the results generated by the other opinions.”); Williams, supra note 79, at
814–15 (explaining the results test).
83
Williams, supra note 79, at 814–15, 815 n.93 (writing that courts should look to all opinions,
including dissents, to identify the controlling fifth vote).
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lower courts, despite the fact that no other Justice agreed with her
reasoning. 84 In 2018, the Court heard oral arguments on the Marks rule in
Hughes v. United States. 85 Though Hughes gave the Court an opportunity to
clarify which opinion was the controlling opinion in Freeman under the
Marks rule, the Court ultimately avoided the Marks issue and decided Hughes
on other grounds. 86
Another notable application of the Marks rule is exemplified in
Apodaca v. Oregon. 87 In that case, a four Justice plurality determined
that there was no constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict for
a conviction. 88 However, in his concurrence, Justice Powell argued that there
was, in fact, a constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict in federal
criminal trials, but that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate this
against the states. 89 Then, in Ramos v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court
concluded that there was actually “no controlling opinion at all” in Apodaca. 90
In Ramos, the parties did not attempt to argue that Justice Powell’s
opinion was controlling because the reasoning he relied on had been rejected
under recent precedent. The plurality in Ramos seemed to dismiss the
possibility that the Marks rule could be used to overturn a precedent, arguing
that “a rule like that would do more to harm than advance stare decisis.”91
However, Justice Alito pushed back on this argument in his dissent,
addressing what should happen when a Marks applied concurrence would
overrule precedent. 92 He wrote, “the logic of Marks dictates an affirmative
answer, and I am aware of no case holding that the Marks rule applies any
differently in this situation.” 93 He further wrote, “[t]he logic of Marks applies
equally no matter what the division of the Justices in the majority, and I am
aware of no case holding that the Marks rule is inapplicable when
84
564 U.S. 522, 534–45 (2011); see, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 665 F.3d 344, 348 (1st
Cir. 2011) (“In the uncertain wake of Freeman, two other courts of appeals, have published opinions
addressing this question. Both agree with our conclusion” that Justice Sotomayor’s opinion controls.)
(citing Sixth Circuit and Fourth Circuit); United States v. Keith, No. 04-354, 2012 WL 253103, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2012) (stating that “the circuits that have addressed the issue all agree that Justices
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion is the controlling opinion in Freeman. . . . [and that] . . . other judges in
this district who have considered the issue agree that Justice Sotomayor’s [ ] concurring opinion is the
controlling opinion.”) (citing First, Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits).
85
See 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018).
86
See generally 564 U.S. 522 (2011); Justin Marceau, Argument preview: Narrowing the “narrowest
grounds” test, or simply interpreting a federal statute?, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 20, 2018, 10:42 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/03/argument-preview-narrowing-narrowest-grounds-test-simplyinterpreting-federal-statute/; 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018).
87
See generally Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), overruled by Ramos v. Louisiana,
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
88
Id. at 411.
89
Johnson v. La., 406 U.S. 366, 371–73 (1972) (addressing Apodaca, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and
Johnson in the same concurring opinion).
90
See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1403–04.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1440 (Alito, J. dissenting).
93
Id. at 1431 (Alito, J. dissenting).
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the narrowest ground is supported by only one Justice.” 94 Given the
disagreement among the Justices regarding proper Marks application, it is
easy to understand how lower courts have struggled to apply plurality
opinions properly and decide which opinion is controlling. 95
III.

HOW DID WE GET HERE? A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT
ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE

In 1992, the Supreme Court issued its plurality decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 96 This case
reshaped how the judiciary was to evaluate abortion restrictions.
Under Roe v. Wade, the Court concluded that women had a right to an
abortion until a certain point in gestation. 97 But under Casey, the plurality
concluded that the state could impose abortion regulations so long as it did
not place an undue burden on a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion. 98
Some legal scholars refer to the Court’s decision in Casey as a “split-thedifference approach.” 99 On one hand, the Court rejected the absolutism that
right-to-life advocates argued for and reaffirmed the core holding of Roe v.
Wade. 100 But the Court also refused to apply the strict scrutiny review the
Pennsylvania abortion restrictions that Roe v. Wade seemed to require and
refrained from declaring this issue a woman’s “right-to-choose” that prochoice advocates were seeking. 101 Instead, the Court adopted the “undue
burden” standard, which is comprised of a two-part test: (1) is there a
substantial state interest, and (2) does the restriction pose an undue burden? 102

94
Id. (Alito, J. dissenting). For a more in-depth discussion of the Marks issue in Ramos,
see Maxwell Stearns, Modeling Narrowest Grounds, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 117–129 (2021).
95
See generally Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942 (2019) (arguing the
Marks rule should be discarded and we should require a majority to reach binding precedent);
Williams, supra note 79, at 814–15 (arguing for a shared agreement approach, which is a clarification of
the Marks rule to make it less confusing).
96
See generally 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Of course, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), came first, which
established a general constitutional right to abortion.
97
See 410 U.S. at 164–165.
98
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–78. An in-depth discussion of the abortion landscape in America is
regrettably beyond the purview of this Article. For a more thorough analysis, see MARY ZIEGLER,
ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA: ROE V. WADE TO THE PRESENT (Cambridge University Press, 2020).
99
Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars,
118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1351 (2009); see also Danielle Lang, Truthful But Misleading? The Precarious
Balance of Autonomy and State Interests in Casey and Second-Generation Doctor Patient-Regulation,
16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1353, 1363 (2014) (“The Court’s opinion reflected an understanding of the rights
in conflict at issue in the case before them, unlike the Roe decision, which no longer reflected the values
embedded in the debate over a woman’s right to choose.”); Natalie Wright, State Abortion Law After
Casey: Finding “Adequate and Independent” Grounds for Choice in Ohio, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 891, 900
(1993) (“The Casey decision was not a clear victory or defeat for either side of the abortion debate but a
compromise—like the Roe decision—only granting more power to the state in favor of coercion.”).
100
Devins, supra note 98, at 1328.
101
See id. at 1328.
102
Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
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Following Casey, lower courts applied the undue burden standard,
and the Supreme Court heard a handful of cases on the issue. 103 A brief survey
of lower court decisions illustrates the significant confusion judges have had
in determining what constitutes an undue burden. For example, in
Cincinnati Women’s Services v. Taft, the Sixth Circuit held that a law that
applied to practically all women in a population was considered an undue
burden, but a restriction that applied to only 12% would not create such
a burden. 104 In another case, Jane L. v. Bangerter, the Tenth Circuit held that
when the state’s clear intention was to pass a law to challenge Roe,
the legislation has the purpose of creating an undue burden. 105
Many circuits are also wary of First Amendment challenges to
informed consent provisions in abortion laws. The Fifth Circuit rejected
a First Amendment claim in Texas Medical Providers Performing
Abortion Services v. Lakey, writing “[i]f the disclosures are truthful and
non-misleading, and if they would not violate the woman’s privacy right
under the Casey plurality opinion, then [plaintiffs] would, by means of their
First Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck between
women’s rights and the states’ prerogatives.”106 The Supreme Court provided
very little guidance to lower courts about how to evaluate these restrictions in
light of Casey.
The Supreme Court again reviewed the undue burden standard in
2016 with Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 107 At issue in the case was
a Texas law that required abortion physicians to have admitting privileges at
a hospital within thirty miles of the abortion clinic. 108 The law would have
had the effect of shutting down almost thirty-five out of forty-two abortion
clinics in the state. 109 In a five-to-three decision, the Court struck down the
103
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a state law prohibiting partial-birth
abortions as not vague or overbroad and therefore not placing an undue burden in the way of a woman
seeking a legal abortion); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734–35 (2000) (upholding a statute that
prohibited counselors from walking up to women on a public sidewalk within 100 feet of a health care
facility); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 934 (2000) (holding invalid a law banning partial-birth
abortions because the law did not include a health exception for the mother and was therefore vague).
104
Cincinnati Women’s Servs. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 373–74 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Women’s Med.
Pro. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 605 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding an abortion clinic closure acceptable
because plaintiffs could not prove that the vast majority of patients would be unable to seek care at another
clinic).
105
Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1117–18 (10th Cir. 1996).
106
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 2012);
see also Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 696 F.3d 889, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding a law
requiring physicians to tell women that abortions lead to increased rates of suicide as part of the informed
consent process as constitutional under the First Amendment, despite no empirical evidence of the truth of
that statement); see also Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts,
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 193–202 (2018) (explaining that there is more sophistication in constitutional
litigation through interpretation of judicial signaling, finding the “right plaintiff,” and arguing the right set
of facts likely to prompt the Justices to adopt change).
107
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 2301.
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law as creating an undue burden on a woman seeking a legal abortion. 110
Justice Breyer, in his majority opinion, noted that there was no medical
benefit to the provisions that could justify the obstacle the law created. 111
Some legal scholars agree that the ruling added more meaning behind
the undue burden test. 112 First, the holding requires to consider both “whether
a law eliminates access but also whether [it] benefits anyone.” 113
Second, although legislative findings matter, courts “retain the power to
balance the benefits and burdens of a law.” 114 In essence, the undue burden
test became more of a cost-benefit analysis. Finally, the Court seemed to
indicate increasing deference to the trial court findings, which is important in
understanding how evidence is weighed as future cases percolate through the
lower courts. 115
Making sense of exactly how to apply this more concrete yet still
amorphous undue burden test has created much discussion among legal
scholars. Most agree that the outcome of Whole Woman’s Health is that the
undue burden test begins to resemble more of a cost-benefit analysis. 116
This promoted optimism among legal scholars because the cost-benefit
analysis is a framework that the judiciary is much more familiar with, so
ideally, more consistent applications of the test could be applied by lower
courts. 117 But, while the Whole Woman’s Health opinion seemed to clarify
health-justified abortion restrictions, it remained unclear how this test will be
applied to other abortion restrictions. 118 Reproductive rights legal scholar,
Mary Ziegler, noted that Whole Woman’s Health set future litigation about
abortion restrictions to be all about the factual findings of the district court. 119

110
Id. at 2299. Justice Scalia had recently passed, hence the Court had only eight voting members.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, The Death of Justice Scalia: Procedural Issues Arising on an EightMember Supreme Court, 1, 9, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44400 (Feb. 25, 2016).
111
Id. at 2311–12.
112
See David Gans, No more rubber-stamping state regulation of abortion (Jun. 27, 2016, 5:15 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-no-more-rubber-stamping-state-regulation-ofabortion/; see also Mary Ziegler, The Court once again makes the “undue-burden” test a referendum on
the facts, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 27, 2016, 2:34 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-thecourt-once-again-makes-the-undue-burden-test-a-referendum-on-the-facts/.
113
Ziegler, supra note 111 (discussing the outcomes of the Supreme Court decision).
114
Id.
115
Mary Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future of
Abortion Law, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 114 (2017).
116
See Robertson, supra note 7, at 630 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136
S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016)); see also Ziegler, supra note 115 at 78; Fourteenth Amendment--Due Process
Clause--Undue Burden--Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 130 HARV. L. REV. 397, 405–06 (2016).
117
Fourteenth Amendment--Due Process Clause--Undue Burden--Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt, supra note 115, at 404.
118
Id. at 405.
119
Ziegler, supra note 115, at 114.
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She also speculated that scientific uncertainty could become an even greater
component of abortion litigation than before. 120
Notably, Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Alito’s dissent in
Whole Woman’s Health. 121 Justice Alito’s primary argument in his dissent
was that the case should have been barred by res judicata because the
plaintiffs had already litigated the case at the Fifth Circuit, lost on the merits,
and did not petition the Court for review at that time. 122 The dissent lamented
the changing circumstances that the Supreme Court majority now allowed for
the case to move forward on the grounds that the petitioners had gained better
evidence to show how many clinics would close. 123 Further, the dissent
applied the Casey undue burden test and found that the restrictions did not
impose an undue burden and should have been upheld. 124
In 2020, the Court heard June Medical Services v. Russo, which
challenged a Louisiana law that required abortion providers to have admitting
privileges at hospitals—a nearly identical restriction to the Texas law the
Court had struck down in Whole Woman’s Health. 125 However, the makeup
of the Court had changed: Justice Antonin Scalia, who passed away in 2016,
was replaced by Justice Neil Gorsuch, and Justice Anthony Kennedy retired
and was replaced by Justice Brett Kavanaugh. 126
The Court issued a plurality opinion striking down the law, in
a judgment which saw Chief Justice Roberts flip from his vote in
Whole Woman’s Health. 127 But, he concurred only in the judgment, not in the
reasoning. 128 In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts reiterated his belief
that Whole Woman’s Health was wrongly decided, but supported striking
down the Louisiana law on the basis of precedent. 129 He provided a detailed
discussion explaining that based on his reading of Casey, there was nothing
in the undue burden test that required a cost-benefit analysis. 130 Though on
its face, the case was a “win” for abortion rights activists, the opinion has not
stopped speculation about how Chief Justice Roberts may rule should the
facts of the case be different.131 His concurrence embraced Casey and its
120
Id. at 93–98, 109–16 (“Whole Woman’s Health does not foreclose the use of scientific uncertainty
as a justification for restricting abortion, the strategy relied on so successfully by abortion opponents for
decades.”).
121
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
122
See id. at 2230–51 (Alito, J., dissenting).
123
See id. at 2230–31 (Alito, J., dissenting).
124
See id. at 2346–50 (Alito, J., dissenting).
125
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020).
126
Supreme Court Nominations (1789–Present), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/
nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2022).
127
June Med. Servs.,140 S. Ct. at 2133–34 (2020) (Roberts, J., concurring in the judgment).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 2139.
131
This Article will not speculate about Chief Justice Roberts’s signaling in this case. For discussions
about the implications of his opinion on future abortion cases, see Marc Spindelman, Embracing Casey:
June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo and the Constitutionality of Reason-Based Abortion Bans,
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undue burden test, which should secure the right to abortion for women; but,
the remaining question is: what standard of review will state restrictions be
subject to moving forward? 132
So then, what are lower courts to do with this decision? As discussed
previously, under the Marks rule, the narrowest view of the Court is the
controlling opinion. In June Medical, only four Justices would have voted to
uphold the stricter Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit test. However,
Chief Justice Roberts did not indicate any desire to stray from Casey, meaning
there are at least five Justices willing to uphold the undue burden analysis
outlined in that case. Therefore, there stems a logical argument that
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical Services is now the
controlling opinion under the Marks rule because it represents the
position that the majority of the Court would take. Under this application,
Whole Woman’s Health would be deemed overruled.
IV.

HOW LOWER COURTS HAVE APPLIED CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S
CONCURRENCE IN JUNE MEDICAL

As legal scholars predicted, anti-abortion states quickly began
probing to find the most favorable jurisdictions to litigate this critical issue. 133
The issue was put to the test by the Eighth Circuit, in Hopkins v. Jegley,
less than two months after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
June Medical Services. 134
This case arose as an appeal from the district court’s grant of
a preliminary injunction that prohibited the enforcement of recently passed
state laws regulating abortion. 135 In 2017, Arkansas enacted four laws:
109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 115 (2020) (noting that in light of previous case precedent and Chief Justice
Roberts’s concurrence in June that reason-based abortion bans undermine Casey’s vitality and should be
held unconstitutional); Gretchen Borchelt, Symposium: June Medical Services v. Russo: when a “win” is
not a win, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 30, 2020, 12:31 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposiumjune-medical-services-v-russo-when-a-win-is-not-a-win/ (referencing Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence
appears to favor a previous, weaker standard that would allow myriad of abortion bans to remain in place);
Erika Bachiochi, Symposium: The chief justice restores the Casey standard even while undermining
women’s interests in Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 30, 2020, 11:44 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/06/symposium-the-chief-justice-restores-the-casey-standard-even-while-undermining-womensinterests-in-louisiana/ (noting that Chief Justice Robert’s argues, in his concurrence, for justices to weigh
the state’s interests in the issue would require them to act as legislators).
132
Spindelman, supra note 130, at 129.
133
See, e.g., Dov Fox, I. Glenn Cohen, & Eli Y. Adashi, June Medical Services v. Russo—The Future
of Abortion Access in the US, JAMA HEALTH F. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/channels/
health-forum/fullarticle/2770774; Mary Ziegler, Abortion After June Medical, HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. BLOG (Aug. 19, 2020), https://harvardlpr.com/2020/08/19/abortion-after-june-medical/;
John Knepper, Symposium: How to count to one (Jul. 1, 2020, 12:13 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/07/symposium-how-to-count-to-one/; see also Laurie Sobel et al., Abortion at SCOTUS: A Review
of Potential Cases this Term and Possible Rulings (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.kff.org/womens-healthpolicy/issue-brief/abortion-at-scotus-a-review-of-potential-cases-this-term-and-possible-rulings/.
134
968 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2020). June Medical Services v. Russo was decided on June 29, 2020, and
Hopkins v. Jegley was decided on August 7, 2020. Compare June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct.
2103 (2020), with Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2020).
135
Hopkins, 968 F.3d at 913–14.
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(1) prohibiting dismemberment of aborted fetuses; (2) prohibiting sex
selection of a child; (3) regulating the disposition of fetal remains; and
(4) regulating the maintenance of forensic samples from abortions performed
on a child. 136 Prior to June Medical Services, the district court had applied
the Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit analysis. 137 The district court found
a likelihood of success on the merits and thus granted a preliminary
injunction. 138
In a per curiam opinion, the Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary
injunction and remanded the case. 139 The court relied heavily on
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion in June Medical Services, noting
that the Chief Justice rejected the reasoning behind Whole Woman’s Health’s
cost-benefit analysis. 140 The panel quoted Chief Justice Roberts, writing,
‘“[p]retending that we could pull that off,’ Chief Justice Roberts observed,
‘would require us to act as legislators, not judges.’” 141 The court also
highlighted Chief Justice Roberts’s displeasure with the element from
Whole Woman’s Health that gave power to the courts to conduct the costbenefit analysis instead of the legislature. 142
In this case, the Eighth Circuit found that the Chief Justice’s
concurring opinion in June Medical was the controlling opinion under the
Marks rule. 143 Accordingly, because he expressed such disdain for the costbenefit analysis in Whole Woman’s Health, the court found this test was no
longer controlling. Instead, according to the Eighth Circuit, the district court
must evaluate the state laws and determine whether they pose a “substantial
obstacle” or “substantial burden”—not whether the regulations have any
benefit to women. 144 The Eighth Circuit denied a rehearing en banc and
remanded the case back to the district court for further determinations
consistent with their application of June Medical Services.145 Since the case
was remanded, there has been some back and forth between the trial court and
appellate court. There is currently a second preliminary injunction in place
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1803 (2017); id. § 20-16-1904; id. § 20-17-801; id. § 12-18-108(a)(1).
Hopkins v. Jegley, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1055 (E.D. Ark. 2017).
138
Id. at 1051.
139
Hopkins, 968 F.3d at 916.
140
See generally id.
141
Id. at 915 (quoting June Medical Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020)).
142
Id.
143
Id. (“Chief Justice Robert’s [sic] vote was necessary in holding unconstitutional Louisiana's
admitting-privileges law, so his separate opinion is controlling.”).
144
Id.
145
Hopkins v. Jenkins, 968 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc denied (Dec. 15, 2020). The
Eighth Circuit also instructed the lower court to reconsider in light of June Medical and Box v. Planned
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (per curiam). Id. at 916. Box v. Planned Parenthood
presented two questions to the Court: first, the validity of the state’s fetal-remains law, and second, the
constitutionality of genetic-based abortion restrictions. Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1781. The Court granted
certiorari and held that how fetal remains were disposed did not impact a woman’s access to abortion.
Id. at 1781. On the genetic-based abortion restrictions, the Court denied certiorari, leaving a preliminary
injunction in place until another circuit had ruled on the issue. Id. at 1782.
136
137
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preventing the law from going into effect, and as this article was nearing
publication, the case has again been appealed to the Eighth Circuit. 146
With the shift in the Supreme Court over the past few years, there has
been much percolation of abortion regulations among the lower courts. 147
Many lower courts are hearing abortion restriction cases, and the first step in
their analysis is whether or not Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in
June Medical is controlling. 148 Some legal scholars argue that the Marks rule
as applied in Hopkins is correct because June Medical was decided within the
same spectrum as it relates to abortion rights.149 Justice Breyer’s opinion in
June Medical argued for the most protection of abortion rights, whereas
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence argued for narrower protection of
abortion rights. 150 Thus, under this theory, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is
the controlling opinion; because he argues that the proper test is the Casey
undue burden test, that is, the test that should be applied by lower courts
instead of Whole Woman’s Health’s cost-benefit analysis. The undue burden
standard is much more lenient and allows states to pass restrictions more
easily.
Other legal scholars, however, argue that June Medical Services
created no new law because there were two parts to Chief Justice Roberts’s
reasoning: (1) an abortion restriction is acceptable if the state has a substantial
interest and there is not a substantial burden created; and (2) under
stare decisis, admitting privileges requirements are unconstitutional. 151
They reiterate that the Marks rule requires lower courts to determine the
holding of the controlling opinion, which they argue in Roberts’s opinion is
merely that admitting privileges requirements are unconstitutional. 152
Some argue his commentary relating to the proper test is merely dicta and
therefore not binding on lower courts. 153 Therefore, these legal scholars
would argue that the Eighth Circuit improperly applied the Marks rule
to Hopkins.
Although the Eighth Circuit was the first to interpret the meaning of
June Medical Services, other circuits have now done so as well. The results
Hopkins v. Jegley, No. 17-CV-00404, 2021 WL 41927, *5 (E.D. Ark. 2021).
See, e.g., Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 940 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2019), vacated, 944 F.3d 630 (6th
Cir. 2019); Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Parson, 408 F.
Supp. 3d 1049 (W.D. Mo. 2019); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1213
(E.D. Ark. 2019); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. v. Beshear, No. 19-cv-178, 2019 WL 1233575 (W.D. Ky.
2019).
148
See, e.g., Preterm-Cleveland, 994 F.3d at 520.
149
See, e.g., Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion and Precedent, 134 HARV. L. REV. 308, 322–
27 (2020); David S. Cohen, Why Whole Woman’s Health’s Balancing Test Still Applies After June Medical,
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. BLOG (Aug. 24, 2020), https://harvardlpr.com/2020/08/24/why-whole-womanshealths-balancing-test-still-applies-after-june-medical/.
150
Murray, supra note 149.
151
Cohen, supra note 149.
152
Id.
153
Id.
146
147
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are mixed, with the Sixth and Fifth Circuits agreeing with the Eighth Circuit
that Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence is controlling, while the Seventh
Circuit found that June Medical yielded no controlling opinion. 154
In August of 2020, only fourteen days after the Eighth Circuit decided
Hopkins, the Fifth Circuit held that the June Medical decision yielded no
controlling opinion. 155 The court opted to use the reason test instead of the
results-based test. 156 It held that because the plurality and the concurrence
disagreed on what test to apply, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion could not be
considered controlling because it was not a logical subset of the other
opinion. 157 The court wrote, “the plurality’s and concurrence’s descriptions
of the undue burden test are not logically compatible, and June Medical thus
does not furnish a controlling rule of law on how a court is to perform that
analysis.” 158 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit applied the plurality opinion.
The Fifth Circuit quickly vacated this decision and granted rehearing en banc,
and in August of 2021, the court reversed. 159 In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit
adopted Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence from June Medical as the
controlling opinion under Marks. 160 The court found that Hellerstedt’s
balancing test was no longer applicable, writing that “the district court erred
by balancing SB8’s benefits against its burdens.” 161
In the fall of 2020, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit agreed
with the Eighth Circuit and found that the Chief Justice’s concurrence in
June Medical was controlling. 162 The Sixth Circuit wrote that an opinion is
the narrowest under Marks if the instances in which it would reach the same
result in future cases form “a logical subset” of the instances in which the
other opinion would reach the same result. 163 But in cases where a plurality
strikes down a law as unconstitutional, the Sixth Circuit held that the
narrowest opinion is the one that would strike down the fewest laws moving
Applying this test to a recent abortion rights case,
forward. 164
the Sixth Circuit wrote:
154
See generally Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 978 F.3d 896 (5th Cir. 2020); Planned Parenthood
of Ind. & Ky. v. Box, 991 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2021).
155
Whole Woman’s Health, 978 F.3d at 904.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id., vacated, 978 F.3d 974 (5th Cir. 2020). Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10 F.4th 430, 440
(5th Cir 2021) (en banc).
160
Id.
161
Id. at 442.
162
EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 432, 436–37 (6th Cir 2020).
163
Id. at 431 (discussing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and observing
that the Sixth Circuit had applied Justice Powell’s holding that a strict scrutiny standard should apply over
an intermediate scrutiny standard because that was the narrowest rule that emerged from a fractured Court).
164
Id. at 431–32; see Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2002). The Court noted that in
Marks itself, the Supreme Court held that Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court
in Bakke controlled because it provided the most limited protection. Id. (citing Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
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Because all laws invalid under the Chief Justice’s rationale
are invalid under the plurality’s, but not all laws invalid under
the plurality’s rationale are invalid under the Chief Justice’s,
the Chief Justice’s position is the narrowest under Marks.
His concurrence therefore “constitutes [June Medical
Services’] holding and provides the governing standard
here. 165
The Sixth Circuit decided to apply the entire concurrence,
including the undue burden test, not the cost-benefit analysis applied in
Whole Woman’s Health. 166 The panel therefore, applied the Casey undue
burden test and upheld a Kentucky abortion restriction requiring strict
licensing requirements for abortion facilities. 167 In a recent en banc decision
deciding the constitutionality of genetic-based abortion bans, the Sixth Circuit
reiterated in a nine-to seven decision that Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence
in June Medical is the controlling opinion. 168
The Sixth Circuit recently reaffirmed their earlier decision in EMW
in Bristol Regional Women's Center, P.C. v. Slatery. 169 In the case, the
Sixth Circuit upheld Tennessee’s forty-eight-hour waiting period for
abortions. 170 The en banc panel again addressed the Marks issue. As an initial
matter, the court wrote:
The panel majority in EMW ably analyzed the
Supreme Court’s decision in June Medical and reasoned that
the Chief Justice’s concurrence is the ‘holding of the Court’
under Marks v. United States . . . . To the extent we were
unclear in Preterm, we adopt EMW’s thorough analysis
here. 171
The case invoked a similar break in the votes: nine judges in the majority, one
concurrence, and seven dissenters. 172 Judge Moore again took issue with the
lack of analysis the majority took towards the Marks application. 173 She again
pointed out that three-judge panels do not create binding law on an
en banc circuit court, despite the majority calling it “the controlling law of
165
EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 978 F.3d at 433 (quoting Grutter, 288 F.3d at 741) (alterations in
original).
166
Id. at 430.
167
Id. at 433–34.
168
Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512, 525 (6th Cir. 2021) (en banc). This pronouncement
generated some debate among the judges; Judge Batchelder, writing for the majority, held that the
three-judge panel’s adoption of Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence as the controlling opinion in EMW
meant the concurrence was controlling within the circuit. Id. But as Judge Moore points out in her dissent,
although a panel of the Sixth Circuit cannot overrule another panel of the Sixth Circuit, there is nothing
that would prevent the circuit en banc from overruling a divided panel. Id. at 552 (Moore, J., dissenting).
169
Bristol Reg’l Women’s Ctr., P.C. v. Slatery, 7 F.4th 478, 482–83 (6th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
170
Id. at 481, 489.
171
Id. at 481 n.1.
172
Id. at 481.
173
Id. at 491 (Moore, J dissenting).
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our circuit.” 174 The dissenting judges seem to believe that the majority’s
application of Marks was dicta and not based on precedent or reasoned
analysis. 175
Somewhat ironically, in the spring of 2021, the Seventh Circuit also
applied the “logical subset” test to Indiana’s statutory restrictions on minors’
access to abortions and came to a different conclusion.176 Here, the
three-judge panel reasoned that the only common ground between the
plurality and concurrence was that Whole Woman’s Health was entitled to
stare decisis because the facts were so similar. 177 The Seventh Circuit further
reiterated that only that part of the concurrence was entitled to Marks
application by lower courts. 178 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit applied the
Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit analysis, assuming it was still
controlling. This case is currently awaiting a grant or denial of certiorari by
the Supreme Court. 179
In May of 2021, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Dobbs v. Jackson
Women's Health Organization. 180 The case is a challenge to a Mississippi law
that banned elective abortions after fifteen weeks and before the point of
viability. 181 The case presents two relevant questions: (1) whether states can
restrict elective abortion access before viability; and (2) whether the undue
burden standard or a cost-benefit analysis should be applied. 182 However,
certiorari was only granted for Question 1; therefore, this case may be another
missed opportunity for the Court to address the tension between the Mark rule
and the prohibition of anticipatory overrulings. 183 Indeed, at oral argument,
the issue whether Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence was controlling went
largely unaddressed. 184

Id. at 506 (Moore, J. dissenting).
Id. (Moore, J. dissenting).
176
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Box, 991 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 2021).
177
Id.
178
Id. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged in its opinion the different approaches other circuits have
taken to the June Medical concurrence but disposed of the issue by reasoning that the Sixth Circuit’s
approach is inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of Marks. Id. at 751–52. Although
Judge Kanne, the dissenter from the panel’s decision, agreed that the Seventh Circuit has treated Marks
differently than the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, ultimately, they argued that the common denominator
between the plurality and Roberts’s concurrence is the application of the Casey undue burden test before
striking down an abortion restriction. Id. at 755–57.
179
SCOTUSBLOG, Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky Inc.,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/box-v-planned-parenthood-of-indiana-and-kentucky-inc-4/
(last visited Jan. 4, 2022).
180
Order List, 593 U.S., 2 (May 17, 2021).
181
Amy Howe, Court to Weigh in on Mississippi Abortion Ban Intended to Challenge Roe v. Wade,
SCOTUSBLOG (May. 17, 2021, 11:55 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/05/court-to-weigh-in-onmississippi-abortion-ban-intended-to-challenge-roe-v-wade/.
182
John Elwood, One new case, two issues of appellate procedure, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 29, 2021, 4:19
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/04/one-new-case-two-issues-of-appellate-procedure/.
183
Order List, 593 U.S., 2 (May 17, 2021).
184
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, No. 19-1392, Oral Argument (Dec. 1, 2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/19-1392_4425.pdf.
Justice
174
175
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HOW SHOULD THE COURT RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT?

Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion in June Medical
illustrates a rare situation where the controlling opinion—or at least what
some circuits may consider to be the controlling opinion—in effect overrules
current Supreme Court precedent. Thus, an arguably proper application of
the Marks rule is inconsistent with the general rule that only the Supreme
Court can overturn its own precedent. Currently, this issue is percolating
among the lower courts in the abortion context, but it is conceivable that it
will arise in other areas of law as well. The lower courts have very little
guidance from the Supreme Court on how to handle this conflict. It is,
therefore, understandable that Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical has
been applied differently in each circuit that has dealt with the issue so far.
But the non-uniform application of the law is undesirable because it
undermines the principle of equal treatment under the law, and thus the
Supreme Court has an interest in addressing the issue directly. 185
Because the Supreme Court is not bound by its own doctrines the
same way lower courts are, the Justices have the flexibility to issue clear
guidance to the lower courts on how to properly apply Marks and whether
there may be narrow circumstances where an anticipatory overruling is
permitted. The stronger the guidance, the more uniformly the lower courts
can apply the law. But, as this analysis will illustrate, there is not a clear path
for the Court to resolve this conflict. This analysis discusses the benefits and
disadvantages of each possible resolution.
A. Abandoning the Strict Rule that Only the Supreme Court Can
Overrule Precedent
The strict rule whereby only the Supreme Court can overrule its
precedent has proven onerous at times, and it could be time for the Court to
revisit it. A case that was recently denied certiorari, National Coalition
of Men v. Selective Service System, illustrates this problem well. 186
The plaintiffs in that case claimed that the male-only draft registration was
discrimination based on sex. 187 But forty years earlier in Rostker v. Goldberg,
the Supreme Court rejected a very similar claim. 188 The Court concluded,
“[t]his is not a case of Congress arbitrarily choosing to burden one of two
Gorsuch acknowledged that there was a question as to whether Hellerstedt was still good law, but did not
comment specifically on the Marks application issue. Id. at 59:9-60:8.
185
Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, Legal Uniformity in American Courts, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
448, 451 (2019). The desirability of uniformity among federal courts has been around since the creation
of our nation. Id. “Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the
same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.”
Id. at 451 n.3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton)).
186
Nat'l Coal. for Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 969 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 1815 (2021).
187
Id. at 547.
188
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78–79 (1981).
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similarly situated groups . . . . Men and women, because of the combat
restrictions on women, are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft
or registration for a draft.” 189 In the recent case, the plaintiffs argued that
because women could now hold all the same positions in the military as men,
Rostker no longer controlled. 190 The district court agreed, reasoning that
because the dispositive fact in Rostker was that women were not fit for
combat, the case was no longer controlling. 191 However, the Fifth Circuit,
although acknowledging the shift in facts, refused to abandon Rostker and
said: “[p]laintiffs . . . point to no case in which a court of appeals has done
what they ask of us, that is, to disregard a Supreme Court decision as to the
constitutionality of the exact statute at issue here because some key facts
implicated in the Supreme Court's decision have changed.” 192 Clearly, the
plaintiffs here were right in that so much in gender equality jurisprudence has
changed since Rostker was decided. There is a strong argument that it seems
unreasonable to force lengthy and costly litigation on the plaintiffs to appeal
their case all the way to the Supreme Court to achieve a relatively foreseeable
result.
Often, the arguments in favor of strict adherence to stare decisis are
(1) predictability, certainty, and reliance; (2) fairness and uniformity;
(3) judicial economy; and (4) the public image of the court system. 193
However, when the controlling precedent is so clearly eroded and dubious,
these four factors actually weigh in favor of, in narrow circumstances,
allowing lower courts to issue an anticipatory overruling.
First, if the precedent is already dubious, then its predictability,
certainty, and reliance interests are not nearly as strong. As discussed,
stare decisis is not an absolute rule that binds the Court. Parties can always
advocate for a reversal in precedent. Take, for example, Rostker; it can hardly
be said that it was predictable or certain that the Court would adhere to that
precedent given the changes in the way the military and society view the role
of women. Given these changes, it is hard to argue that many women rely on
the precedent. An anticipatory overruling would only occur in very narrow
circumstances where the law has clearly been eroded, so by its very nature,
the reliance factor would not be as strong. 194
Second, anticipatory overrulings allow lower courts to treat all
litigants fairly, instead of changing the law only when plaintiffs can afford to

Id. at 78.
See Nat'l Coal. for Men, 969 F.3d at 548.
191
Nat'l Coal. for Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 355 F. Supp. 3d 568, 576 (S.D. Tex. 2019).
192
Nat'l Coal. for Men, 969 F.3d at 550.
193
Bradford, supra note 27, at 75 (arguing for narrow instances where lower courts can disregard
dubious Supreme Court precedent); see Michael Gentithes, In Defense of Stare Decisis,
45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 799 (2009) (arguing that stare decisis is a crucial part to any strong democracy).
194
Bradford, supra note 27, at 77–78.
189
190
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take their case all the way to the Supreme Court. 195 In the stare decisis
argument, fairness instructs courts to treat similar cases alike. 196
But, in instances where the factors strongly suggest that the Court would not
apply the precedent, it seems to go against the premise of fairness to force
litigants to spend so much time and money to reach a result foreseen by lower
courts. 197 The median time for federal civil cases to get to a final ruling is
26.3 months, and 14.7% of those cases last more than three years. 198
Litigation is incredibly burdensome on parties, so, in cases where the lower
courts can clearly articulate why the Supreme Court would overrule
precedent, there is an argument they should be allowed to do so.
Third, allowing for anticipatory overrulings would allow courts to
react more quickly to changing factual situations. 199 As legal scholar
C. Stephen Bradford wrote:
Without anticipatory overruling, legal progress is segmented.
The law lurches forward first in one limited area and then in
another, as the Supreme Court slowly changes its rules on a
narrow, case-by-case basis. Policies that the Supreme Court
no longer approves remain frozen in time. Obsolete,
disapproved rulings continue to control people's behavior
until a case presenting that precise issue again works its way
to the Supreme Court. Anticipatory overruling, on the other
hand, allows the law to adjust to changes in Supreme Court
policy more rapidly. The transition is smoother and the
benefits of new federal policies become available to the
public more quickly. 200
And fourth, when precedent is shaky, anticipatory overrulings allow
lower courts to acknowledge the precedent’s erroneous reasoning and explain
why they are declining to follow it, which can enhance public perception of
the court system. Blind adherence to precedent or attempts to distinguish
similar cases can sometimes harm the public perception of a lower court
because it is not as legally sound. 201 When the Supreme Court overrules
precedent, the public does not always view that as a bad thing. The public
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id.
198
Arthur R. Miller, Widening the Lens: Refocusing the Litigation Cost-and-delay Narrative,
40 CARDOZO L. REV. 57, 60 (2018). A recent example of just how prolonged some court cases can be is
exemplified in Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). One of the plaintiffs, Aimee Stephens,
was fired from her job in 2013, but the Supreme Court did not issue its final decision until June of 2020.
Aimee Ortiz, Aimee Stephens, Plaintiff in Transgender Case, Dies at 59, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/12/us/aimee-stephens-supreme-court-dead.html (Jun. 16, 2020).
During that time, Stephens developed kidney failure and passed away. Id.
199
See Bradford, supra note 27, at 79–81.
200
Id. at 72.
201
Id. at 82–83.
195
196
197
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cares much more about substantive results—not procedural applications. 202
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s strict rule that only it can overrule
precedent seems outdated. It does not allow lower courts to properly explain
why a case should come out a certain way in situations where the court goes
against precedent.
However, before the Supreme Court clarified its strict stance on
anticipatory overrulings, lower court judges applied very different standards
regarding when to disregard controlling precedent. For example, some judges
would disregard precedent if there was a preponderance of the evidence that
the controlling case would no longer be applied, whereas other judges
required a reasonable certainty that the controlling case would no longer be
applied. 203 The risk of these differing standards would again re-emerge if the
Supreme Court revisited its rule on anticipatory overrulings. Even if the
Court were to articulate a narrow test for when lower courts could disregard
precedent, there would still be potential policy considerations about allowing
lower court judges to speculate on a Supreme Court Justice’s stance on a
particular issue. 204
Speculation as to how the Supreme Court might rule is one of the
stronger arguments against allowing for anticipatory overrulings. All judges
develop their own methodologies for reviewing cases, and these
methodologies should be applied consistently and in good faith across all
cases. 205 This means that even if a judge’s methodology causes them to arrive
at a disfavored result, that should nonetheless be the result. 206 But, in the
context of the Supreme Court, the process by which the Justices reach
a majority opinion is full of negotiations and compromises as the draft opinion
circulates. 207 These discussions among Justices can ultimately lead to
a narrower holding or changes to the language of the opinion. The lower court
judges are not privy to these negotiations. To allow lower courts to attempt
to predict the outcome of a particular case at the Supreme Court is thus
unlikely to reflect the full reasoning of the Court. Supreme Court Justices are
also very careful to avoid publicly stating their view on certain matters
because, when a case comes to the Court, they want to approach it—or at least

Id. at 82.
Id. at 45–46.
204
See id. at 85–88.
205
RICHARD H. FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 129–32
(Belknap Press, 2018).
206
Id.
207
See James F. Spriggs II, et al., Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court: Justices’ Responses to
Majority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485, 485–486 (1999) (discussing the bargaining and compromising
that occurs during the circulation of drafts opinions among the justices); see also Stearns, supra note 94
at 182–87 (analyzing Marks as a bargaining tool).
202
203
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give the impression that they are approaching it—with an unbiased mind and
ready to rule on the specific set of facts before them. 208
Applying this rationale to June Medical, the Court could adopt
a narrow exception to the anticipatory overrulings doctrine and conclude that
in rare circumstances, a single Justice’s opinion can, under Marks, overturn
precedent. This would essentially mean that the Court would formally adopt
the reasoning from the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. As discussed above,
there are inherent benefits to allowing lower courts to disregard binding
precedent when the reasoning, in that case, is no longer sound. This would
allow both the rule regarding anticipatory overrulings and the Marks rule to
stay relatively intact and impact precedent the least.
However, this option for the Court is still problematic. First, lower
courts are already struggling to apply Marks properly. Allowing lower courts
to also disregard binding precedent under Marks would likely only further
complicate matters. As the lower court applications of June Medical have
illustrated, the Marks rule can be interpreted in many different ways.
Unfortunately, absent clearer guidance from the Supreme Court, no one can
say with certainty that one application is correct and another is incorrect.
Second, this could potentially give one Justice far too much power. The Court
has always made decisions via majority rule, but this type of application
would permit one Justice to write a carefully worded opinion if they truly
wanted precedent overturned. This could lead to a legitimacy problem for the
Court. As two legal scholars pointed out, “[f]or an institution like the
U.S. Supreme Court to render rulings that carry authoritative force, it must
maintain a sufficient reservoir of institutional legitimacy . . . .” 209
Such legitimacy stems from the public’s perception that the Court is distinct
from the other branches of government and is less impacted by politics and
rather each Justice applies their own rationale to each case to determine the
result. 210
In recent decades, the all-important “swing vote” has allowed for
some “conservative” decisions in big cases, while other opinions were more
“progressive” decisions. It has kept one political party from consistently
winning, which enhances the appearance of a neutral Court. 211 The ways
Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy would vote were seemingly difficult

208
See, e.g., Tyler Cooper & Dylan Hosmer-Quint, When Justices Go to School: Lessons from Supreme
Court Visits to Public Colleges and Universities, 15 (2020), https://fixthecourt.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/FTC-public-universities-report-3.24.20.pdf (noting that justices will often limit
the number of guests allowed in a given talk, prohibit recordings, or let a school know ahead of time that
currently pending cases are off-limits for questions).
209
Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court
Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 184 (2013).
210
Id.
211
Jonathan S. Gould, Rethinking Swing Voters, 74 VAND. L. REV. 85, 128 (2021).
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to predict. 212 In a speech in 2018, Justice Kagan questioned how the Court
would continue to be seen by the public absent these swing votes. 213 She said:
Part of the Court’s legitimacy depends on people not seeing
the court in the way that people see the rest of the governing
structures of this country now. In other words, people
thinking of the Court as not politically divided in the same
way, as not an extension of politics, but instead somehow
above the fray. . . . 214
But the importance of the swing vote and what they can do for the Court’s
perception is minimized when there is no incentive to compromise to reach
a majority opinion. If one Justice really wants to carefully articulate their
opinion to achieve a desired result, then the Court stands to lose a lot of
credibility with the public. Of course, one would hope that the Justices would
apply the law and reason through their opinions in good faith. But, the public
perception of the Supreme Court, particularly in times of political tension, is
incredibly important. 215 How this type of application could delegitimize not
only the Supreme Court but also lower courts as they would struggle to apply
this should not be understated.
B. The Court Could Abandon Marks
On the other side of the spectrum, the Supreme Court could decide to
abandon the Marks rule. Lower courts have struggled with the application of
Marks, and instead of attempting to fix the doctrine, some legal scholars argue
for its abandonment. 216 The strongest argument for its abandonment is that
Marks applies only when there is no majority opinion, and therefore creates
precedents that are not desirable. 217 In place of Marks, no binding precedent
would be created in plurality opinions. 218
However, abandoning Marks would create issues reaching far beyond
just the June Medical context. The Supreme Court has relied on Marks in a
variety of different types of cases. 219 To abandon the Marks rule would
require the Court to sacrifice some of its precedent that has created reliance
See id. at 89.
Sophie Tatum, Justice Kagan worries about the ‘legitimacy’ of a politically divided Supreme Court,
CNN (Oct. 5, 2018, 10:06 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/05/politics/supreme-court-elena-kaganlegitimacy/index.html (quoting Justice Kagan from a speech she gave at Princeton University in 2018).
214
Id.
215
See Robert Barnes, The political wars damage public perception of Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Roberts says, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/thepolitical-wars-damage-public-perception-of-supreme-court-chief-justice-robertssays/2016/02/04/80e718b6-cb0c-11e5-a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html.
216
See Re, supra note 95, at 2007–08 (arguing that the Marks rule should be discarded and we should
require a majority to reach binding precedent).
217
Id. at 1943–44.
218
Id. at 1946.
219
Id. at 1952 (noting that the Supreme Court majority opinions have cited the Marks rule nine times
and non-majority opinions have cited it fifteen times).
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interests over time. To mitigate this problem, the Court could decide to
abandon Marks prospectively. 220 Thus, only foreclose new plurality
decisions. This would preserve precedent but still help correct some of the
issues with Marks. It would also likely be more straightforward for lower
courts to apply because they can look to pre-existing case law to help apply
older case law that would have required a Marks application. But confusion
would persist in areas of law where Marks applications were already creating
confusion for lower courts. Thus, merely abandoning Marks prospectively
does not resolve current issues with Marks applications by lower courts.
For example, it would not serve any benefit in the abortion context because
June Medical has already been decided.
Some argue for the abandonment of Marks to apply retroactively,
even though it would be costlier in terms of precedent because it would
eliminate all of the confusion that Marks has created. 221 However, the
floodgates of litigation that would open cannot be overlooked. Not only
would this question the holdings of Supreme Court cases that relied on Marks,
but also circuit court cases that relied on Marks when creating their
precedents. 222 Moreover, many lower court decisions implicitly applied
Marks but did not engage in any meaningful discussion of its application;
thus, the true scope of the impact a retroactive application could have
is unknown. 223 This could significantly change reliance interests or cause
parties who lost their case because of Marks to feel slighted or lose their trust
in the judicial process.
If the Court abandoned Marks, then only majority opinions could
create binding precedent. This sometimes will put the Justices in tough
situations. Either they can vote against their own preferred judgment to get
a majority or relinquish their power to create a binding precedent on lower
courts. But the Court has been doing this in cases for decades. One of the
first examples of this occurred in Screws v. United States. 224 In that case,
Justice Rutledge concurred in the judgment but wrote a separate concurrence
to voice his own reasoning in how he got to the judgment, which was different
from the plurality. 225 Another example arose in United States v. Vuitch. 226
The case was an interlocutory appeal of a district court ruling that an abortion
law was unconstitutionally vague. 227 Although five Justices believed
the Court had jurisdiction, only four thought that the district court judge had
Id. at 2007.
Id.
Id.
223
Id.
224
See 325 U.S. 91 (1945). For an in-depth discussion on the Screws opinion, see Re, supra note 95,
at 1998–2000.
225
See id. at 113–34.
226
See 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
227
Id. at 63.
220
221
222
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committed reversible error. 228 Justice Blackman, who did not believe
the Court had jurisdiction, joined the other four Justices to reverse the error;
he wrote, “[b]ecause of the inability of the jurisdictional-issue majority to
agree upon the disposition of the case, I feel obligated not to remain silent as
to the merits.” 229
Justices have also, in select cases, recognized the practical effect
of fractured opinions and have adjusted their opinions to reach a
disposition. One of the more well-documented accounts of this was in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 230 The case involved the detention of alleged enemy
combatants and their rights to due process. 231 Both Justice Souter and
Justice Ginsburg believed that the prisoners should win outright but decided
instead to join the plurality in order to achieve a majority on the judgment. 232
Justice Souter wrote:
Since this disposition does not command a majority of the
Court, however, the need to give practical effect to the
conclusions of eight members of the Court rejecting the
Government’s position calls for me to join with the plurality
in ordering remand on terms closest to those I would
impose. 233
This approach has advantages and disadvantages. This would
obviously fly in the face of the general rule that Justices should adopt
a personal judicial philosophy and apply it to all cases. 234 It would instead
force Justices to bargain with each other and possibly sacrifice their own
values in order to reach a majority. This could confuse the public if Justices
were seemingly changing their judicial philosophies from one case to the next.
It could appear as though they were making arbitrary decisions when instead
the Court should aim to write clearly reasoned opinions to gain the support
and trust of the public.
Even recently, Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Kagan sparred over the
application of judicial philosophy. In Edwards v. Vannoy, Justice Kavanaugh
was critical of Justice Kagan for inconsistent application of her judicial
philosophy:
Justice Kagan dissented in Ramos . . . it is of course fair for
a dissent to vigorously critique the Court’s analysis. But it is
another thing altogether to dissent in Ramos and then to turn
around and impugn today’s majority for supposedly
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Id. at 62–64.
Id. at 98.
See 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Id. at 511.
Id. at 553.
Id.
FALLON, supra note 205, at 129–31.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss1/4

2022]

A Whole Woman’s Mess

73

shortchanging criminal defendants. To properly assess the
implications for criminal defendants, one should assess the
implications of Ramos and today’s ruling together. 235
Justice Kagan explained that she “dissented in Ramos precisely because of its
abandonment of stare decisis. 236 Now that Ramos is the law, stare decisis is
on its side. I take the decision on its own terms, and give it all the consequence
it deserves.” 237 She then responded to Justice Kavanaugh’s criticism, writing,
“[i]t treats judging as scorekeeping—and more, as scorekeeping about how
much our decisions, or the aggregate of them, benefit a particular kind of
party.” 238
Even though this option may force justices to soften their own
personal judicial philosophy and work with the other justices, it is beneficial
because it creates a clear binding precedent. This doctrine thus forces the
justices to do their jobs—work out their reasoning at the Supreme Court level
or “forgo the power to create binding precedential rules” instead of leaving it
up to lower courts to figure out the narrowest reasoning. 239 In close cases,
“the fact that a swing voter’s support is necessary for a majority to exist allows
the swing voter to dictate the content of legislation or judicial doctrine.” 240
Having the Supreme Court explicitly outline the binding precedent would
help ensure uniform application of the law instead of inconsistent applications
across different circuits.
In the case of June Medical, abandoning Marks would resolve the
tension relatively quickly. Because June Medical did not produce a majority
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence would yield no controlling
weight. Instead, Whole Woman’s Health would be the clear precedent still
intact, and its cost-benefit analysis would continue to be applied to abortion
restrictions when challenged. There could be some issues if the Court decided
only to abandon Marks prospectively since the Marks rule applications by
lower courts have already begun. A prospective application thus would not
be very helpful in the June Medical context. But both a retroactive and
prospective abandonment would easily resolve the issue in future cases.
C. The Court Could Modify the Marks Rule
Another option would be for the Court to attempt to justify that these
rules can coexist even though right now they seem to be in direct conflict with
one another. This would effectively be done by the Court’s formally adopting
235
141 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (2021) (holding that Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, does not apply
retroactively).
236
Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. at 71 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
237
Id.
238
Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. at 71 n.8 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
239
Re, supra note 95, at 2000, 2006–07.
240
Gould, supra note 207, at 88.
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what the plurality argued in Ramos and thus modifying Marks. In Ramos,
the plurality briefly sparred with the dissent over whether or not a single
justice’s opinion can overturn precedent. 241 The plurality dismissed this idea
claiming that Marks “never sought to offer or defend such a rule” and that
“a rule like that would do more to harm than advance stare decisis.” 242
It, therefore, seems possible that the Court could conjure up reasoning
that would allow for Marks to remain the rule; but in cases where a single
opinion would serve to overrule precedent, that opinion could not
be considered controlling on the lower courts. This would allow both
the Marks rule and strict prohibition on anticipatory overrulings to coexist
without the Court having to abandon one or both of its doctrines.
Both doctrines are important cornerstones of judicial reasoning, so this
approach is appealing because it does not force significant change onto the
lower courts by disrupting numerous cases of settled precedent.
But, as the dissent in Ramos highlights, there is no existing authority
for the Court to justify such an interpretation. As Justice Alito noted, Marks
applies equally to all opinions, no matter the division of Justices. 243 It is
perfectly acceptable for the narrowest grounds to come from a single Justice’s
opinion, or at least lower courts have read Marks in this way, and the
Supreme Court has never corrected them. 244 Justice Alito then turned to
whether a single justice’s opinion could overrule precedent. Because Marks
is applied equally in all cases, Justice Alito concluded that it can.245 However,
he declined to go into an in-depth discussion because the “question is
academic.” 246
Of course, the Court created the Marks rule, so the Court can amend
the doctrine in dicta as it deems fit. But the Marks opinion does not attempt
to distinguish between one-Justice opinions versus those joined by a greater
number of Justices in a way that would justify explicitly amending the Marks
rule to not overrule precedent. 247 The application of this clarified rule would
likely confuse lower courts beyond the degree to which they already are
confused. Should the Supreme Court prohibit its application in certain
circumstances, this would likely lead to piecemeal applications across the
circuits.
There are other ways that the Court could choose to modify Marks
beyond adopting the Ramos reasoning. There has been some scholarly work
See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1403–04 (2020).
Id.
243
Id. at 1431 (Alito, J., dissenting).
244
Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
245
Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
246
Id. (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Stearns, supra note 94, at 498–504 (2021) (discussing whether
a singular opinion can be the narrowest).
247
See generally Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
241
242
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suggesting ways the Court could modify the Marks rule, though extensive
discussion of the different suggestions is beyond the purview of this
Article. 248 Most suggestions legal scholars have suggested focus on how
lower courts should apply Marks, meaning setting forth a clearer rule for how
to determine the narrowest opinion. While any of these applications could
help alleviate the tension between Marks and anticipatory overruling, lower
courts already have a challenging time just applying Marks. Thus, it would
be reasonable to predict that changing the rule, even slightly, would lead to
even more confusion, therefore perpetuating the problem of inconsistent
applications until the next case reaches the Supreme Court.
In the case of June Medical, this application would resolve the
conflicts in the abortion restriction setting very quickly. It would mean that
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion was not controlling. This change
would, therefore, leave Whole Woman’s Health intact and require the Sixth,
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits to revisit their recent case decisions that say
otherwise. Although this option seems attractive because it allows for the
resolution of the issue as it appears in the abortion context, in the long-term,
it does not resolve the inherent tension between the Marks rule and
anticipatory overrulings. It seems difficult to justify why some opinions
should be treated differently than others in a Marks application. When the
reasoning is not sound, this issue will almost certainly arise again.
D. Avoiding the Issue Altogether
The Supreme Court, at least in the context of June Medical, could
avoid the issue of precedent altogether. The Justices could achieve this by
endorsing Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion as a full majority, or
it could issue a majority clearly reaffirming Whole Woman’s Health.
Such a move was seen in Grutter v. Bollinger through its application
of Justice Powell’s single concurring opinion from Board of Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke. 249 Similar to today’s issues with
June Medical, the circuit courts had a difficult time grappling with the various
opinions of Bakke. The Fifth Circuit, persuaded by the fact that no other
Justice endorsed Powell’s opinion, found that his opinion was not
controlling. 250 However, the Ninth Circuit, applying Marks, found that it was
controlling because a majority of Justices wanted to allow some race-based
considerations in higher education admissions. 251 When the issue re-emerged
248
See Williams, supra note 79, at 838–59 (arguing the Court should adopt the shared agreement
approach); Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of
Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 447–57 (1992) (arguing that plurality opinions should bind only as
to their result and the reasoning of the various opinions should be considered as persuasive only);
Stearns, supra note 94, at 519–25 (discussing the problems with Marks).
249
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323–25 (2003).
250
Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 275 (5th Cir. 2000).
251
Smith v. Univ. of Wash. L. Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2000). For a more in-depth
discussion over the evolution of the case law since Bakke and leading to Grutter, see Lehmuller & Gregory,
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at the Supreme Court in Grutter, the Court acknowledged that the Marks
application of the fractured Bakke opinion was greatly confusing lower
courts. 252 But, the Court completely sidestepped the issue of identifying the
controlling opinion in Bakke instead writing, “[w]e do not find it necessary to
decide whether Justice Powell's opinion is binding under Marks . . . today we
endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling state
interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.” 253
The Court could very well adopt the same technique here and not
address the tension between Marks and anticipatory overrulings in the context
of June Medical. It is true that this would allow the Court to dispose of the
issue with abortion restrictions, and this would help to provide lower courts
with clearer guidance on the test to apply to abortion restrictions in the future.
But it would not prevent the Marks and anticipatory overrulings problem from
arising again in a different area of law. As one legal scholar put it,
“[e]ven commentators who have proposed reforms to the Marks doctrine have
sometimes characterized their efforts as ‘damage control,’ viewing the task
for lower courts as making the best of a bad situation the Supreme Court thrust
upon them with its abdication of its institutional responsibility.” 254 It is clear
that Marks has caused more confusion than its perceived benefits suggest.
Accordingly, it would be prudent for the Court to take this unique
conflict among doctrines as an opportunity to clarify and refine Marks and
anticipatory overrulings. This type of conflict occurs only rarely; but, when
it does, it leads to fractured circuit case law, which is not desirable because
it does not promote public trust in the judiciary. Especially because this
conflict has arisen most recently in politically charged areas of law such as
abortion and affirmative action—it is important for uniformity among federal
courts. The Supreme Court should, therefore, use Dobbs as an opportunity
to acknowledge that Marks has led to varying circuit court interpretations
and address how lower courts should move forward. This will give
lower courts much-needed guidance and allow for better application of case
law across all circuits.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As this Article has highlighted, there is no clear way for the Court to
resolve the tension between Marks and anticipatory overrulings.
Each potential solution has its advantages and disadvantages. Framing these
issues in the context of June Medical helps illustrate some of the results that
supra note 75, at 434–47 (explaining the difficulty lower courts had in deciphering which opinion, if any,
was controlling from Bakke).
252
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325
253
Id. The Court here also wrote, “[i]t does not seem ‘useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost
logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered it.’”
Id. (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994)).
254
Williams, supra note 79, at 822 (citing Thurmon, supra note 248).
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each option would yield. These doctrines have been incredibly difficult for
lower courts to apply consistently. Accordingly, there is a need for the
Supreme Court to offer proper guidance to the lower courts. Failure to do
so will likely lead to inconsistent applications throughout the country, which
is not in the interest of fairness and could harm the perception of the federal
court system. The Court will have to consider which option will have the
least disruptive effect on precedent while still providing clear guidance to help
create a more standardized approach moving forward. Although challenging,
the Supreme Court created these doctrines, and it needs to be responsible for
clarifying the proper applications of said doctrines.
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